As enterprise blockchains become increasingly interconnected, access control must extend beyond the boundaries of a single network. Existing approaches mainly focus on controlling access within one blockchain, while cross-chain interactions involve multiple networks that may follow different access-control policies and administrative rules. In this paper, we propose InterAcct, an end-to-end access-control framework for secure interactions across permissioned blockchain networks. To avoid exposing sensitive internal information, InterAcct converts outgoing requests into a consortium-level representation before they are shared with another network. When a response is returned, the framework securely maps it back to the original requester within the source consortium, preserving confidentiality throughout the interaction. Our experimental results show that InterAcct can enforce end-to-end access control for cross-chain request-response interactions with low additional overhead and can continue to operate effectively as the workload increases.

最近修訂： 2026年10月4日. 閱讀論文與版本歷史 ↗

The Ethereum blockchain utilizes the EIP-1559 algorithm to manage transaction inclusion and block assembly. However, EIP-1559 and much of the existing literature study this problem from a static perspective, focusing on price evolution without modelling transaction dynamics within the mempool. Motivated by this limitation, we study a dynamic transaction scheduling problem in which transactions with heterogeneous sizes and per-unit values arrive over time and remain in the mempool until scheduled. To capture the stochastic mempool evolution, we formulate the problem as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) whose state represents the mempool configuration and whose actions correspond to block prices. We first provide a primal-dual interpretation of the static EIP-1559 mechanism, showing that block prices arise naturally as dual variables of a social-welfare maximization problem. Building on this perspective, we extend the framework to the dynamic setting and formulate an objective that maximizes long-run discounted reward while incorporating holding costs and overshoot penalties. We then employ a Natural Policy Gradient (NPG) algorithm to compute the optimal policy. Our results show that dynamic pricing stabilizes the mempool while maximizing long-run discounted reward. In particular, as the overshoot penalty increases, the average scheduled transaction volume converges to the target block capacity, and the resulting NPG updates closely resemble the EIP-1559 price update rule. Finally, we study two special cases of the MDP formulation: homogeneous transactions and uniform arrivals. In the homogeneous setting, where the protocol directly controls scheduled volume, we show that the optimal policy has a threshold structure. We then propose a bang-bang pricing mechanism for uniform arrivals and derive a lower bound on the block capacity needed to ensure system stability.

最近修訂： 2026年9月28日. 閱讀論文與版本歷史 ↗